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Ethical Citizenship and the Stakeholder Society 
Thom Brooks 
 
Introduction 
Ethical citizenship is an idea about a relationship between individuals. Their relation is 
grounded in the concept of social recognition where individuals come to recognize their 
shared commitments and obligations. This understanding of ethical citizenship and social 
recognition has received penetrating criticisms, such as the charge that this view fails to 
satisfactorily address reasonable pluralism and that it leads to a too demanding view about 
citizenship. These critics argue that the construction of a shared identity risks damaging the 
other more particular forms of identities we possess. Philosophers ranging from John Rawls 
to Bhikhu Parek defend very different, and perhaps opposing, proposals for how we might 
forge a sufficiently robust shared identity while permitting our other identities to flourish. 
This chapter seeks to defend an old idea on new grounds. It argues that we should 
understand ethical citizenship in terms of a stakeholder society. Stakeholding is about a 
principle: those who have a stake should have say. A stakeholder society is a form of 
community where its members are citizens sharing in recognition and equal respect. 
Stakeholding requires not only that citizens can have a voice on outcomes where they may 
have a stake, but understand themselves as stakeholders. Simply put: to be a stakeholder 
requires equal opportunities for stakeholding and the conviction of oneself as a stakeholder. 
This perspective does not commit us to rejecting alternatives—from Rawls’s pursuit of an 
overlapping consensus to Parekh’s defence of equal respect—but it does require their revision 
to incorporate stakeholding. 
The chapter first considers contrasting models for a form of ethical citizenship 
defended by Rawls and Parekh. It next argues these models fall short of addressing a crucial 
dimension of political alienation and why this is important. The heart of the chapter focuses 
on a novel application of stakeholder theory to citizenship—and why it is relevant and, 
indeed, necessary. The chapter closes by demonstrating how the stakeholder society model 
offers a more compelling model of ethical citizenship and its implications 
 
Two Models of Ethical Citizenship 
Ethical citizenship is about the normative relationship of individuals to each other as equal 
members of a political community. There are several different general approaches to 
citizenship familiar to political theorists (Brooks 2013a). This is typically presented as 
passive and active, often republican, models of citizenship. The first model understands 
citizenship as a kind of status and the second as a kind of engaged relationship. Passive 
citizenship concerns individuals enjoying equally shared rights and opportunities, such as 
their being subject to the rule of law, the ability to participate and contest elections. Active 
citizenship is this and more where citizens are modelled as persons engaged in deliberation: 
individuals do not merely enjoy certain rights from their shared status, but they participate 
through debate and engagement as citizens. 
Citizenship is often argued to include special duties and obligations between citizens 
not shared with non-citizens. Citizens from different countries might be held to share 
common obligations across borders, such as to provide assistance to others in severe poverty. 
But citizens are thought to have obligations exclusive to fellow members of their particular 
political community.  
This idea is contested primarily by strong cosmopolitans, following Seneca’s 
declaration that he was a citizen of the world, who deny individuals can have such special 
obligations justified in virtue of a shared political community that does not include all 
humanity. However, most dispute not the existence of common bonds shared between co-
nationals giving rise to special duties, but the ground for these bonds.  
There is generally wide support for a normatively-informed view of shared 
citizenship. Citizenship is a political concept and about the relations of people to institutions. 
A commonly shared view is that the borders that should count are not political boundaries, 
but moral ones: the normative justification for the special duties arising from shared 
citizenship are grounded on their normative strength. So citizenship based on non-arbitrary 
connections linking individuals often inhabiting a shared territory can have normative 
significance where, for example, these connection have intrinsic value for their members and 
do not deny any more general duties to all persons independently of citizenship (see Miller 
2007; Margalit and Raz 1990). The borders that count are the ones we draw around people, 
not the ones found on maps however more convenient the latter are (see Goodin 1988). 
The main question is: so what is this shared connection? The idea that citizens possess 
a common  form of identity is less controversial than the diversity of claims about how this 
should be substantiated. Let us focus on two distinctive and contrasting models that have 
each received widespread attention. 
The first model is defended by John Rawls. He focuses on the problem of political 
stability overtime for modern societies. Rawls argues every society is characterized by the 
diversity of different ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ its members hold.1 These 
doctrines concern individual views about values and the good. Doctrines may be religious, 
philosophical or moral. This includes all major religious faiths and leading philosophical 
approaches. The problem of political stability arises because of the diversity of doctrines held 
by citizens: we require some model to determine how to resolve conflicts among them. For 
example, citizens affirming Catholicism might defend different policies on abortion and 
capital punishment than Utilitarians.
2
 
Rawls’s problem is significant because he assumes that any acceptable theory of 
political justice will secure and maintain equality between citizens. So if citizens disagree 
about which public policy should be promoted by the state, Rawls argues our solution to this 
problem must not prioritize one view of the good over others: we must give equal respect the 
different views about the good held by citizens. We cannot insist everyone affirms the same 
doctrine, but instead discover some alternative to address our differences (Rawls 2001: 3). 
Otherwise, the problem is that some may become unequal as some views about the good win 
support at the expense of others. 
Rawls defends the idea of an overlapping consensus as a solution to the problem of 
political stability (Rawls 1996: 132—72; 2001: 32—38). The argument is that we can respect 
the diversity of views held by different citizens through building a new consensus that can 
connect everyone irrespective of whichever view any citizen endorses (Rawls 1996: 10). This 
consensus is to be constructed through the use of ‘public reasons’: the claims we may 
reasonably offer to others to construct an overlapping consensus (Rawls 1999b: 208). A 
reason is ‘public’ where it can be endorsed by persons across all reasonable doctrines. People 
with different views might continue to disagree, but policies supported by public reasons are 
                                                 
1
 See Rawls 1996: 24—25n227, 63—64, 129, 140, 144, 147—48, 172; Rawls 1999a: 131; Rawls 2001: 3—4, 
33-34, 36, 40, 84. 
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 Two clarifications are necessary. The first is that Catholicism is one of many world religions that would count 
as a reasonable comprehensive doctrine in Rawls’s terminology—and similarly Utilitarianism is one of many 
philosophical views. These two are used only as one example of a potential conflict between doctrines. The 
second clarification is that I do not suggest that Catholicism and Utilitarianism are always at odds. My claim is 
instead that they ‘might’ defend different policies using abortion and capital punishment as an illustration. So, 
for example, Catholics are opposed to capital punishment, but Utilitarians could support it if its use maximised 
utility. Rawls’s challenge is determining a method to decide how to resolve such conflicts without choosing one 
doctrine over another. 
accessible to anyone notwithstanding the different views people might have. For example, the 
reason that capital punishment should be banned because it runs contrary to Catholic doctrine 
is not a public reason. This is because the reason it offers requires us to accept Catholic 
doctrine if we are to find it convincing. Instead, we should aim to offer public reasons that do 
not make such demands on others and so at least secure the possibility of acceptance by all. 
So Rawls’s model is about constructing a shared political conception from across diverse 
views of the good through the use of public reasons that all could support. Citizens should 
engage others using reasons all might share. 
Rawls’s model has received much criticism. Some argue a shared commitment to 
principles of justice is enough to secure political stability and so an overlapping consensus is 
unnecessary (see Barry 1995; McClennen). Others argue that an overlapping consensus is too 
weak a bond because the public reasons connecting us might be reasons all could accept, but 
none or only a few might accept in fact (see Greenawalt 1995; Wenar 1995). The first 
criticism fails to recognise the need to engage with the deep differences about the good found 
in any modern society. The second criticism fails to grasp that an overlapping consensus is 
not the only connection between citizens accounted for by Rawls (see Brooks 2014). 
The second model of citizenship is defended by Bhikhu Parekh. While Rawls seeks to 
find ways of overcoming our differences, Parekh embraces them. He recognises the twin 
challenges modern societies face. On the one hand, there should be a strong sense of common 
identity among citizens in order to decide and enforce collectively-binding decisions. On the 
other hand, a strong bond can nurture the inescapable diversity found in every society: ‘A 
weakly held society feels threatened by differences and lacks the confidence and the 
willingness to welcome and live with them’ (Parekh 2006: 196). But how? 
 Parekh claims the morally and culturally neutral liberalism of Rawls claiming to be 
equally hospitable to all is impossible. Parekh argues: ‘no state can be wholly free of moral 
and cultural biases and the concomitant coercion on those who disapprove of its structure or 
actions. Even a state that institutionalizes such values as liberty and equality coerces those 
who are opposed to them’ (2006: 202). The community must choose and it should not burden 
itself with trying to be neutral to all views of the good. 
 Many liberals defend the so-called public-private divide. The idea is that public 
spaces are the subject of possible state intervention while private spaces are not. So every 
home is a person’s castle where she can act however she pleases, but such a freedom ends 
when interacting with others in society. This distinction is crude and some liberals have 
begun to account for the private sphere to some degree.
3
  
Nonetheless, Parekh highlights how this view of the public and the private gets wrong 
something crucial about culture and religion. The liberal defending this distinction limits the 
public sphere to exclude culture and religion. This might be part of an effort to demonstrate 
neutrality. For Parekh, culture and religion defy the public-private distinction. He argues: 
 
Religious persons see life as a whole and seek to live out their deeply held beliefs in 
their personal and collective lives . . . If [the liberal] confined religion to the private 
realm as he generally does, he would discriminate against religious people, alienate 
them from public life, provoke their resistance, and endanger the very unity for whose 
sake he excludes religion from the public realm (Parekh 2006: 203). 
 
In essence, limiting culture and religion to the private sphere alone is self-defeating. Rather 
than foster greater unity for all, it may in fact drive citizens further apart and risk political 
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 Rawls is a good example of this. He became convinced by Susan Moller Okin that the family should be 
counted as part of society’s basic structure to which principles of justice applied. 
alienation. Our differences concerning values and the good distinguish some from others, but 
they need not push us apart. 
 Parekh argues our common political identity should be located in shared political 
institutions ‘and not the widely shared personal characteristics of its individual members’ 
(2006: 231). The diversity of identities held by individual citizens should be enjoyed and 
without any stigma of possessing divided loyalties. Any national identity should be defined 
so it includes all its members and made possible for them to identity with it. Such an identity 
must not be merely located, but shared (Parekh 2006: 232).  
So Parekh’s model is more comfortable with multiculturalism: our differences should 
receive recognition and equal respect, but equal options does not mean equal opportunities in 
fact. He argues opportunity is ‘a subject-dependent concept’ (Parekh 2006: 241). To say all 
have the same options to attend a particular school is not to claim each has equal 
opportunities. For example, all children might have the same option to be admitted to a local 
school, but it might ban the wearing of turbans. Such a scenario might fail to provide equal 
opportunities despite extending the same options because some persons, such as male Sikhs, 
who want to wear a turban would not be permitted to do so at that school. And so issues of 
culture and religion are not merely private and neutrality can lead to outcomes that can 
disproportionately affect some more than others. 
Rawls and Parekh endorse opposing models of citizenship. Rawls’s model views 
diversity as a problem to overcome. His solution is to create a new shared political 
conception—or overlapping consensus—through the use of public reasons that could be 
endorsed by anyone. Parekh’s model understands diversity as a challenge to be embraced. 
His solution is to focus on creating a more self-assured sense of national identity as the best 
means of fostering the cultural and religious diversity we have: instead of moving away from 
diversity, it becomes further embedded. Our common unity comes from a national identity all 
can identify with, such as a shared set of institutions.  
 
The Problem of Political Alienation 
Rawls’s and Parekh’s models for citizenship are attractive in many respects, but both face a 
challenge from the problem of political alienation. Rawls’s model aims for a commonality 
forged through public reasons where policies are selected for reasons few, if any, do endorse. 
The fact a public reason is a public reason, for Rawls, is not itself a reason to accept it. There 
is a real danger to the reciprocity between citizens that Rawls claims is so central to political 
justice where citizens come to feel alienated. Likewise, for Parekh, a common sense of 
belonging requires effort whether it is cultural, national or otherwise. But what to do about 
persons who fail to see how they belong or how they might share a valuable identity with 
others? 
Citizens are disillusioned by politics perhaps more so than ever before, or at least in 
many Western societies.
4
 Any theory about ethical citizenship must have a view about how 
this view of citizens might avoid or overcome problems about political alienation. This 
alienation is often characterised as voters refusing or unwilling to go to the polls during 
elections, but it speaks to a problem much more fundamental than this. 
We should distinguish between political alienation and political agnosticism. Political 
agnosticism is often what many have in mind when they point to poor voter turn-out as an 
example of alienation. Political agnostics are citizens who have suspended their engagement. 
Politics lacks importance or priority for that individual, but this is from choice and she can 
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 This qualification is important for at least two reasons. The first is that generalizations cutting across all 
communities East and West are difficult to substantiate. The second reason is my greater familiarity with 
political alienation within the Western context, its problematic dimensions and how these might be addressed by 
stakeholding which is my central focus in this chapter. 
choose to reengage in future. For example, political agnostics might prefer assisting with 
charitable activities or watching a television programme to voting or other forms of political 
engagement. Reasons for avoiding politics can be praiseworthy or mundane. However, the 
key is that such a person’s disengagement is a product of choice at a given time that can 
change in future. 
Political alienation is a different type of disengagement that involves a more 
permanent, and problematic, sense of self. This is presented powerfully by G. W. F. Hegel in 
his comments concerning ‘the rabble’: 
When a large mass of people sinks below the level of a certain standard of living . . . 
that feeling of right, integrity [Rechtlichkeit], and honour which comes from 
supporting oneself by one’s own activity and work is lost. This leads to the creation of 
a rabble (Hegel 1990: 266). 
Commentators have typically understood Hegel’s rabble in mostly economic terms. For 
example, Shlomo Avineri has argued that if market capitalism necessarily creates and 
perpetuates such a rabble then the solution is to transition the economy away from capitalism 
(see Avineri 1974). In contrast, Raymond Plant claims that Hegel’s problem can be solved by 
ensuring everyone has some means of employment, such as through an expanded civil 
service, so that no one falls below a threshold of well-being (see Plant 1983). 
 These interpreters fail to grasp Hegel’s position. The central problem of the rabble is 
not that they may live in poverty, but that they possess a particular sense of political 
alienation (see Brooks 2012a). Hegel argues: ‘Poverty in itself does not reduce people to a 
rabble’ (1990: 266). To be a member of the rabble is to have a mind-set—it is to have a 
conviction about the relation of self to others that affirms that oneself is separate from others. 
Society is a place for others and by others; that my voice would not be heard even if I were to 
speak.  
 Hegel’s rabble may live in poverty or even great wealth: either can contribute to a 
conviction of separateness from others. The alienated are not merely disinterested like 
political agnostics, but disengaged and they lack the belief their alienation can or should be 
overcome. So the political disconnection someone may believe exists between him and others 
will seem fixed and either beyond their ability to fix or to care about changing it. 
 Hegel identifies the existence of a rabble—or politically alienated citizens—as one of 
the most significant problems for modern society. If our community should be a place all 
might call home, then what to do for those who see it as a place of disconnection or 
oppression? Which how might our models of citizenship better address this problem? 
 
Ethical Citizenship as Stakeholding  
The problem for Hegel’s alienated rabble is their conviction about their disconnection from 
others. This can be understood as a problem about stakeholding: that the politically alienated 
fail to see themselves as stakeholders in the political community. The idea of ‘stakeholding’ 
originates in the literature on business ethics and corporate governance, but it resonates with 
the issue of alienation (see Freeman et. al. 2010). Stakeholder theory argues that good 
corporate management should involve various stakeholders in its decision-making process. 
Stakeholders are defined generally as those with a stake in the outcome from some collective 
decision by a firm (Sachs and Rühli 2011: 37). Stakeholder theory is about not only a 
different way to manage a firm, but a vision about economic justice and sustainable markets 
(see Hutton 1999; Hutton 2010). 
This can be translated into the realm of citizenship by viewing stakeholding as a 
principle of justice: those who have a stake should have a say on outcomes that affect them. 
As with the firm, this requires ethical decision-making to be inclusive of those with a stake 
and transparent so those with a stake are able to reach informed views concerning their 
decision-making in an interactive framework no less down-up than top-down. Citizen 
stakeholding is inclusive on principle by involving all persons with a stake to inform the 
decision-making processes that affect them. It is transparent insofar as relevant information is 
made available to stakeholders. Otherwise, stakeholders are unable to feed into the decision-
making process effectively. Finally, stakeholding is interactive whereby communication 
feeds across channels and networks rejecting a top-down only structure. This perspective 
views citizens as sharing an identity as stakeholders who view themselves and others as 
having a voice in public deliberations because of the stakes each has in them. 
Crucially, stakeholding is about this principle with a conviction about self-
understanding themselves as stakeholders. To be a stakeholder is to see myself as a 
stakeholder: it is not only about the opportunities others offer us, but about how we see 
ourselves. A community of stakeholders is a world away from a rabble society. The issue is 
the connections that transform us from a rabble to stakeholders.  
The stakeholder view of citizenship conceives the citizen as not politically alienated. 
This does not mean that every citizen must exercise his or her voice where he or she has a 
stake: the fact that I have a stake entails I should have a say and not that I must, perhaps 
under coercion, exercise my say. But it does entail that the failure of some citizens to see 
themselves as stakeholders is not only a problem for those persons, insofar as the possession 
of this lack of conviction is a problem. This is a problem for us, those citizens who accept the 
principle and conviction of ourselves as stakeholders. This is because if those who have a 
stake should have a say fail to see themselves as stakeholders it calls into question the stakes 
for all. Political alienation is an issue that stakeholding can help us identify. 
 British Idealism may hold some useful insights. While none defend explicitly 
stakeholder theories, several argue for positions consistent with stakeholding and they 
develop in in interesting ways. Many British Idealists shared Hegel’s concerns about the 
rabble and the need to address political alienation. For example, T. H. Green claims ‘these 
dangerous classes’ of people are individuals with ‘no reverence for the state . . . no sense of 
an interest shared with others in maintaining it’ (1941: 33 [§7]). Green’s point is not that the 
state must or should be obeyed wherever it is found. The issue concerns persons who reject 
entering into any shared interest with others under any circumstances. Green claims such 
persons cannot be forced to see themselves as stakeholders by coercion (1941: 109 [§98]). 
Instead, we must encourage a change of heart because ‘there is no right “but thinking makes 
it so”’ (Green 1941: 140—41 [§136]). This view supports the stakeholder approach by 
confirming the importance of our having the conviction of seeing ourselves as stakeholders. 
The failure of some to share a conviction that they are also stakeholders is a problem for the 
political community and a sign of its imperfection (Green 1941: 129 [§121]). Individuals 
must come to see themselves as having ‘a share’ in the ‘making and maintaining the laws 
which he obeys’ as a stakeholder, requiring a conviction about a particular ‘feeling of 
political duty’ and connection to other citizens (Green 1941: 130 [§122]). 
 Stakeholding plays an important role in the work of other British Idealists as well. F. 
H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet separately argue that the self is constructed in relation to 
others through a process of mutual recognition (Bradley 1927: 161; Bosanquet 1965: 142—
43). Each person engages others as equals as part of a shared, public endeavour. This 
engagement helps us construct our shared legal and political institutions, and informs the 
development of our individual self-understanding (Bradley 1927: 163, 173). Others, such as 
James Seth, claim it is not enough for us to consider ourselves as stakeholders, but rather we 
must become convinced free from the coercion of others (1898: 211—12).  
 The shared interest all persons have is in fostering and maintaining a common good. 
This good is a good for all that does not exclude any citizen. Our common good points to a 
substantial unity in our common social purpose to secure its flourishing for the benefit of 
each individual (see Hetherington and Muirhead 1918: 20). The common good is not a mere 
ideal, but grounded in our practical needs. Indeed, John Henry Muirhead claims that when 
done well ‘philosophy at all times . . . has had its roots in man’s practical needs. To try to 
severe it from these is to cut it off from the springs of life’ (1924: 312). So a view about the 
common good divorced from our practical needs is effectively render it dead. Our common 
good is the source of our ‘common well-being’ (Green 1941: 124 [§117]). 
 The common good finds expression in our mutual recognition of rights shared equally 
with other citizens in our political community. Our rights are not a product of arbitrary 
guesswork, but instead forged through common agreement after engaged deliberation. Rights 
represent our substantial freedoms to do or achieve that command political and legal 
protections (see Brooks 2012b: 127). Crimes can be understood as violations of these rights. 
Their punishment is an effort at the restoration of rights violated by crimes. James Seth 
argues: 
This view of the object of punishment gives the true measure of its amount. This is 
fond not in the amount of moral depravity which the crime reveals, but in the 
importance of the right violated, relatively to the system of rights of which it forms a 
part (1907: 305). 
What is key is ‘the protection of the right in question’ that is threatened by a crime (Seth 
1907: 305). Punishment aims to restore rights through their protection and maintenance. Our 
rights are worthy of retention because they demarcate the fundamental freedoms we have and 
so require this protection.
5
 
Many British Idealists are supportive of our common good including the embrace of 
cultural diversity. For example, Seth claims culture addresses ‘the man in the man’ (1898: 
248). Our self-realisation and fulfilment comes through our social interactions with others 
(Seth 1898: 269—70; Mackenzie 1924: 318). Seth argues that ‘to cut him off from others, to 
isolate him, would be to maim and stunt his growth’ (1898: 289). Political alienation is not a 
path to self-improvement and it is harmful to it. Our aim is to ensure the connections we 
enjoy to each other are forged primarily at the individual level and not imposed from above 
(Seth 1898: 297). This is because overcoming the conviction of alienation is perhaps 
something the state can influence, but should not impose. We are all better for it: the good 
life is ‘a richer form of life’ for everyone (Muirhead 1910: 260).6 Our sharing a common 
good while respecting our differences reflects a kind of harmony (see Ritchie 1905: 296). 
This is important because it accounts for our unity and diversity without sacrificing either. 
For Bosanquet: ‘Man can only be fully realised as social when he is fully distinguished as 
individual’ (1999: 110). 
 Modern stakeholder theory came long after the golden age of British Idealism in the 
late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. While Idealists developed a broadly shared philosophical 
perspective using their own Hegelian-inspired terminology, it is also true that they adopt and 
develop views present in stakeholding. This is important because they are sensitive to the 
problem of political alienation and the need for an ethical account of citizenship to respond 
constructively to it. They recognise the need to view stakeholding as requiring not only 
opportunities for stakeholder engagement, but creating a social and political space that all 
citizens can recognise as theirs and share a common identity—and conviction—about their 
being a stakeholder. This is to be pursued not by denying diversity, but embracing it through 
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 This view of punishment is compelling, in part, because it can account for cases of pardons understood as 
contexts where the protection and maintenance of a violated right does not require an act of punishment (see 
Brooks 2012b: 130). 
6
 See Muirhead 1910: 186: ‘Just as contact with various concepts and ways of thinking expands the mind and 
makes it at home in the world of ideas which we call culture, so a rich environment of institutional forms opens 
up the spiritual horizon and makes a man a citizen of the moral universe’. 
a recognition that all citizens share in a common good located in mutually acknowledged 
rights that form an important core linking citizens together. Ethical citizenship is a kind of 
stakeholding. 
 
Towards a Stakeholder Society 
Does a stakeholder society have importance for us today?  
It is clear that it can supplement citizenship models we have already considered. For 
example, Rawls’s model focuses on how we might overcome our differences and create a 
shared overlapping consensus through public reasons. Part of Rawls’s claim is securing such 
a consensus is important to honour and guarantee the equality of citizens: this is why he 
claims we cannot support one view of the good over other views in pursuit of some new, 
consensus that every reasonable comprehensive doctrine can buy into. If the equality of 
citizens is not fulfilled, then he fears that citizens will lack reciprocity by failing to see others 
as equals and so undermine the social bonds that can enable political stability over time. If 
Rawls’s models accounted for stakeholding, then he might recognise that a consensus based 
on public reasons is insufficient. This is because Rawls simply assumes honouring principles 
of justice, such as fair equality of opportunity and equal basic rights, will by themselves 
protect against political alienation. But there is no reason to assume—and countless 
contemporary counterexamples on hand—that convictions of common identity can and 
should follow the creation of a consensus built on reasons all can accept, but none might 
accept. 
But let us now consider a second model that I believe is more congruent with 
stakeholding: Parekh’s model that views our diversity as a fact to be embraced while 
pursuing a common identity of shared belonging (see 2006: 237, 263). Parekh emphasises the 
need of citizens to not only view their government as a legitimate political entity, but 
guarantees they are ‘justly treated and enjoy respect for their cultural identities’ (2006: 237—
38). He says: 
While cherishing their respective cultural identities, members of different 
communities also share a common identity not only as citizens but as full and relaxed 
members of wider society, and form part of a freely negotiated and constantly 
evolving collective ‘we’ (Parekh 2006: 238). 
Stakeholding is about each of us being part of this collective ‘we’ and viewing ourselves as 
such. This is the problem of being in a community, but not of it (Parekh 2014). The 
importance of collective goals like a common sense of belonging is no less important than 
equality (see Parekh 2006: 263). This is explicit in Parekh’s model of citizenship and 
compatible with the stakeholder account of ethical citizenship defended in this chapter. 
 Stakeholder theory can inform ethical citizenship for a modern world characterised by 
diversity. This builds off of Parekh’s model of citizenship and the perspectives of many 
British Idealists. This new perspective of citizenship can better address the problem of 
political alienation that creates serious concerns for alternative views. Ethical citizenship as 
stakeholding acknowledges that celebrating our inescapable differences need not entail we 
possess weak collective bonds, but highlight through the ideas of a common good how 
strength in diversity can be achieved. 
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